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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman, COMOR

SUBJECT : Proposed Limited Clearance for
Use in TALENT System

PROBLEM: To devise a type of clearance which will permit unescorted physical access to a T or T/K Center of personnel who have no need for knowledge as to the sources or nature of T or T/K substantive intelligence, but whose normal duties require frequent access to such a Center. Examples of such personnel include those providing logistical services, safety officers, medical officers, security officers and repairers of safekeeping equipment.

DISCUSSION: 1. Throughout the TALENT System there are Centers which require considerable support and servicing by personnel who have no need to handle or discuss T or T/K information. It is known that in the near future several additional large TALENT Centers will be placed into operation which inherently will require similar support. Continuous escorting of service and support personnel within a Center works a hardship on personnel assigned to a Center because regular duties cannot be handled, thus reducing the normal output of such employees. It is also evident that the efficiency of certain types of support service is reduced as the result of delays and problems in providing continuous escorting within a Center.

2. In the past some service and support personnel as described herein have received TALENT and TALENT/KEYHOLE clearances with the usual indoctrination materials

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made available to them as part of their briefing. Thus, classified T or T/K information has been divulged to such personnel, although their duties did not require such a detailed indoctrination. It is believed that security of the TALENT System would be strengthened through the use of a limited clearance to an area along with a limited indoctrination, thus reducing the spread of information but serving the support purpose.

3. Personnel requiring frequent access to TALENT Centers for non-intelligence purposes would have to meet the established personnel security clearance standards for T or T/K clearances. The security indoctrination would stress the sensitive nature of the intelligence material compartmented within the TALENT Centers, but would not describe the source of the intelligence. It would be necessary to approve billets for personnel considered for such limited clearances. Records of clearances granted would be retained as a separate category of clearance within the TALENT System. Clearance totals would be reported periodically to the Executive Office of the President.

4. TALENT Centers would be required to adopt appropriate internal controls to ensure that personnel holding limited clearances would be clearly identified by badging or other means so that they would not be exposed inadvertently to T or T/K substantive intelligence.


5. A request for a limited clearance for access to a TALENT Center would require careful scrutiny and the application of these criteria:

a. The person involved does not have a "must know" for substantive T or T/K intelligence. If otherwise, a full clearance would be necessary.

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b. The person's duties
require continuing access to a Center,
rather than infrequent access.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. In order to enhance security of the TALENT System and to increase efficiency and output by eliminating the need to escort certain types of service and support personnel within TALENT Centers, it is recommended that a limited T or T/K clearance to be titled "Administrative Entrance Clearance" be adopted for use in clearing such personnel for physical access only, to TALENT Centers.

2. It is further recommended that the attached security indoctrination and secrecy agreement form be approved for use in administering this clearance.

R. L. Bannerman
Director of Security

ATTACHMENT:
(as stated)

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